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ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL BANKING SECTOR LINKAGES: DID THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN THE LINKAGES?
James Edward Benton 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand
This dissertation examines the interactions or linkages between the U.S. banking 
sector and the other eight major banking center countries around the globe. I use the 
national banking sector index for each country over a ten year period as a proxy for 
reactions to external shocks and examine whether these shocks spillover from the U.S. to 
the other major banking center countries as measured through their respective indices. I 
examine both daily residual returns as well as return volatility to measure these 
interactions between indices.
This study uses a vector auto-regression moving average (VARMA) as well as 
Granger-causality Wald test to examine the linkages among the major banking sectors in 
the international markets. For robustness I use a State Space analysis to test the linkages 
among the nine major banking sector countries. My findings show that the U.S. national 
banking sector has directional influence over the eight other major national banking 
sectors including: France, Germany, Switzerland, U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, 
and Canada. Furthermore, I find that the influence that the U.S. national banking sector 
exerts on the other major banking sectors appears to diminish after the financial crisis 
occurred on September 15, 2008.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
September 2008 marks a point in history that no one who studies and works in the 
financial arena will soon forget. It will always be remembered as the “financial crisis”, 
the point that saw many financial institutions close their doors and others surrendering to 
low priced buyouts. A plethora of consolidations over the next couple of months with 
enormous governmental intervention from around the world left many with a chill about 
the financial future of many financial institutions if not the countries themselves and the 
financial world as we know it.
The popular business news outlets then as well as now have made many 
speculations as to the cause of this financial crisis as well as its effects on individual 
firms and industries to whole economies. One such often stated effect is that U.S. banks 
in general and the U.S. banking industry as a whole became much more volatile because 
of the securitized mortgage backed securities that many U.S. banks held on their books. 
Additionally, often cited is the impact that the U.S. banking industry had on the other 
banking centers around the world. As the U.S. banking industry goes, so goes the rest of 
the world banking community. The goal of this paper is to examine whether this popular 
claim of U.S. banks and the U.S. banking sector specifically has more influence over the 
banks and banking sectors of other industrialized countries during this time frame as well 
as examining any linkages between the U.S. banking sector and the banking sectors of 
other banking center economies.
The developed nations that are the major banking centers of the world already
have taken actions in recognition of the real or perceived linkages of the worldwide 
banking system through the Basel Accords. The Basel Accords are an affirmative 
acknowledgement by the nine major banking countries of the world that the banking 
industry is interconnected and truly global in nature and therefore, all banks need to be 
governed by the same set of capital requirement rules.
The Basel Accords are agreements by participating countries regarding banking 
regulations that are applied to all banks worldwide of those signatory countries. More 
specifically, Basel I, II, 2.5, and III are agreements by the signatory countries regarding 
the capital requirements by the banks within their countries. Basel I started the process 
and was a very simplistic capital requirements agreement. Each subsequent Basel accord 
has become more complex in the analysis of capital requirements with Basel III, the most 
current accord, taking into consideration risk assessments and management of assets held 
by the respective banks. Basel III accord made changes that are a direct result of the 
financial crisis of 2008.
All nine of the countries in this study are signatory countries of all of the Basel 
accords. Therefore, all banks within the nine counties of this study are required to meet 
the minimum capital requirements of Basel I, II, and 2.5 with Basel III accord in various 
stages of implementation in all nine countries. However, each country has the 
capabilities of exerting influence over its own banking sector through various 
mechanisms individually.
To empirically test the popular claim that the U.S. banking sector has an 
overwhelming influence on the rest of the global banking sectors I analyze the banking
sectors of the nine largest industrialized economies via their respective banking sector 
indices to determine the causal linkages, speed or timing of these linkages as well as the 
strengths of any linkages. This study provides evidence that the U.S. national banking 
sector does exert influence over the other major national banking sectors around the 
globe. This influence is consistent over the entire period of the study but it’s persistence 
on the other major national banking sectors changed in various ways, depending on the 
respective national banking sector, since the financial crisis occurred on September 15, 
2008. These results have far reaching policy implications for bankers, investors and 
researchers worldwide. They may also provide indications o f things to come in the future 
regarding the U.S. influence in the global banking system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and 
ideas that form the background for this study. Section III describes the research design 
and data used. Section IV presents my empirical results while section V provides a 
discussion and conclusion.
4CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
There are two main streams of research that provides the theoretical support for 
this research study design. The first research stream is focused on international 
transmission of stock market movements, international stock market linkages, 
international stock market integration, and financial contagion. Over thirty years have 
passed since the groundbreaking study by Eun and Shim (1989) documenting a 
substantial degree of interdependence among national stock markets. Previous research 
focused on intra-country stock price movement versus inter-country stock price 
movement among national stock markets.
The popular financial media often over uses the phrase “financial contagion”, 
most recently regarding the Greek and European Union financial situation and its impact 
on other countries in the European Union. However, they often fail to define what 
“financial contagion” even means. They further fail to distinguish financial contagion 
from “interdependence of financial markets” or “linkages o f financial markets”. This 
was the focus of Karolyi (2003) in his survey article examining the various definitions, 
taxonomies, and previous academic research in the area of International financial 
contagion, interdependence and linkages.
Karolyi (2003) defines international financial linkages as co-movement of 
international financial asset prices due to a natural free flow of investor-capital flows or 
fundamental based co-movement. Karolyi (2003) further found two varying degrees of 
what is termed “contagion”. Fundamental contagion which is the absence of strong
linkages but where rational investment decisions made by financial agents or rational 
investor based co-movements. In other words, fundamental contagion is the investors’ 
reactions to financial opportunities and/or risks in the global markets. Additionally, there 
is an irrational contagion that is sometimes seen as an increase in risk aversion, loss of 
confidence, herd behavior, and/or full blown financial panic. He noted that both degrees 
of contagion are more of a phenomenon when markets such as exchange rates or stock 
prices turn down. In other words, contagion is more of a panic on the downside rather 
than on the upside. (Karolyi, 2003).
Prior to the late 1980s, academic research of international stock market linkages 
were thought to be weak linkages at best. Despite the various empirical techniques 
employed, numerous studies generally found that (i) correlations among returns to 
national stock markets were surprisingly low and (ii) national, not international, factors 
play an important role in the return-generating process. (Eun and Shim, 1989)
Eun and Shim (1989) used a vector autoregression (VAR) methodology to 
examine how much of the movements in one national stock market could be explained by 
another, whether the United States stock market influenced other national stock markets, 
and if one national stock market did influence another, how quickly the price movements 
get transmitted to the other markets.
Since Eun and Shim (1989), the focus has shifted to studies regarding inter­
country stock price co-movements among national stock markets. Eun and Shim (1989) 
found that all of the eight largest European and Pacific Rim national securities markets 
responded most strongly to U.S. shocks with a 1 day lag with most of the markets
responses to U.S. shocks completed within 2 trading days at most.
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) examined stock market linkages similar to Eun 
and Ship (1989) but with a twist. Their analysis was limited to only five major stock 
markets instead of nine, they used a cointegration methodology to analyze linkages 
among the markets and they were able to examine any changes of these linkages after a 
major shock. Using a new technique at the time that followed a well specified error 
correction model of cointegration by Engle and Granger (1987), they were able to avoid 
filtering out potentially important information regarding long-run common trends among 
non-stationary stock indices. (Arshanapalli and Doukas, 1993).
Arshanapolli and Doukas (1993) used the new cointegration technique to examine 
the interdependence or linkage among five international stock markets: the U.S., the 
U.K., France, Germany, and Japan both prior to as well as after the 1987 U.S. stock 
market crash. They found a fairly weak interdependence among the five stock markets 
pre-1987 crash and increased international co-movements among stock indices post- 
1987 crash. They also found that the U.S. stock market had considerable impact on the 
European stock markets of the U.K., France and Germany but not on the Japanese stock 
market.
Masih and Masih (2002) later used both a VAR as well as cointegration 
methodologies while adding the Granger-causality test to examine a post globalization 
period of causal price transmission among national stock markets. Their results were 
similar to Eun and Shim (1989) as well as Arshanapolli and Doukas (1993), the U.S. 
stock market does influence the other major stock markets around the world.
The second stream of research is the interaction of major banking sectors or 
individual banks and how financial shocks in one country, one major banking group, or a 
number of major banks can spillover into other country banks, major banks, or banking 
sectors.
Peek and Rosengren (1996) examined the financial shock transmission from 
Japanese banks into the US banking system. Although their study did examine two major 
banking center countries it was limited to examining stock market impacts, the financial 
shock, on banking operations. This study is focused on the banking centers themselves 
across all nine countries as well as the linkages among the banking centers.
Jokipii and Lucey (2006) examined the banking sector co-movement between the 
three largest Central/Eastern European countries (CEEC) to determine if  there were any 
interdependence or linkages. Although they found some limited linkages, they used a 
simple unadjusted correlation analysis and their study was limited to three intra-regional 
small national banking sectors. What they were lacking in methodology and samples 
they made up for in thought for an empirical study.
Chan-Lau, et al (2012) used an extreme value theory approach to examine 
contagion risk across the international banking sectors. They did find that contagion risk 
among the major global banks appears to have increased over time and that banks tend to 
be more vulnerable to financial shocks during more volatile financial times than when 
times are calm which support previous literature regarding contagion in general. 
However, their study focuses on very large individual banks, 24 of the largest banking 
groups around the world, rather then an aggregate approach by specific country banking
8sectors.
Hsiao (2012) used an extremal dependence model to identify and measure 
financial shocks across international markets as well as country banking sectors. Hsiao 
(2012) did use daily banking equity indices as I do but excluded several of the largest 
banking center countries such as Japan and Switzerland. Additionally, Hsiao (2012) 
limited the period to an overall four year window.
Ongean, et al (2013) examined cross-border spillover affects through the banking 
activities of large multinational banks. They focused on 155 banks located in sixteen 
different countries. They focused on the examining and measuring the changes of bank 
lending behavior after the financial crisis. Although this examined cross-border reactions 
it focused only on the banks and not the banking sectors as a whole in the different 
countries.
Although there is a plethora of research studies focusing on contagion, linkages, 
and/or interdependence among national stock markets either globally or regionally as 
well as various research studies examining banking contagion and linkages in general, 
there is a shortage of academic research examining similar linkages/interdependence 
among individual industries or sectors within the national stock markets. Especially of 
interest is the study of co-movements or interdependence among the largest national 
banking centers in the world. In other words, empirical research to address the financial 
media’s speculation of contagion or interdependence/linkages among the largest banking 
sectors around the world and the ripple effects that may take place when a major financial 
meltdown occurs. This study is an attempt to begin filling in this gap in the research.
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
I used the proven theory that the U.S. stock market influences the other major 
stock markets around the world with the expanding research stream of banking linkages. 
Although the U.S. national stock market theory is more developed and empirically tested, 
the banking linkages stream is still developing and is more regional in nature at this point 
in time. Using similar empirical methodologies as the national stock market linkage 
literature and adding an additional cutting edge methodology of State Space analysis, I 
apply them to the interaction and influence transmission between the U.S. national 
banking sector to the other major banking sectors around the world. From these two 
streams of research I propose three empirically testable hypotheses.
My first testable hypothesis stems from the question of what appears to happen to 
the whole happening to the individual parts. In other words, if there is interdependence 
among national stock markets does it hold that those same relationships will also be 
evident in the underlying segments of the national stock markets as well? Here I look at 
the largest sector of the respective national stock markets, the banking sectors.
Hypothesis 1: Given the proven linkages among national stock markets, would
banking sectors exhibit similar linkages as well?
As in Eun and Shim (1989) as well as Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) that found 
in their respective studies that the US stock market influences other major national stock 
markets around the globe but they do not have a reciprocal effect on the US stock market. 
Here I propose a second testable hypothesis to examine whether the US banking sector
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has a similar influence over the other major banking sectors around the globe. Is the US 
a clear leader, follower or neither with regards to the other large banking center countries 
around the globe.
Hypothesis 2: If there are linkages among national banking sectors then what role 
does the U.S. banking sector play; does it lead, lag, or exhibit contemporaneous 
moves with the other major banking sector countries?
Lastly, as in Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) my third hypothesis centers around 
change after a financial or market shock. I propose a third testable hypothesis of whether 
the interdependence and influence among the national banking sectors, if any, that was 
noted prior to the 2008 financial meltdown changes post 2008 financial meltdown.
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal if there is a linkage of national banking sectors 
among the largest national banking sector countries, how did the intensity of this 
linkage change after the global financial crisis that occurred on September 15, 
2008?
These three empirically testable hypotheses should give a clear indication as to 
the global linkages between the U.S. national banking sector and the eight other global 
banking center countries, what role the U.S. national banking sector plays, that o f a 
leader, laggard or contemporaneous member, and whether there is a noticeable change if 
any in the linkages immediately following the financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY & DATA
4.1 EMPIRICAL MODELS
To fully test and evaluate the hypotheses articulated previously, I estimate a nine- 
nation banking sector vector-autoregressive moving average (VARMA) using the log of 
the daily rates of return on the respective national banking indices from January 4, 1999 
through September 26, 2010. Additionally, I estimate a nine-nation banking VARMA 
pairwise analysis using the log of the daily rates of return squared to evaluate the 
volatility over the same periods. Lastly, as a robustness test, I run a state space model of 
the daily rates of return as well as the volatility over the same time periods. The nine 
national banking indices included in this study are four representing European countries:- 
France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; three representing Pacific Rim 
countries: Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan; and two representing North American 
countries: Canada and the United States.
The vector-autoregressive moving average (VARMA) analysis estimates 
unrestricted reduce form equations that have uniform sets of lagged dependent variables 
of every equation as regressors. The VARMA thus estimates a dynamic simultaneous 
equation system, free from a priori restrictions on the structure of relationships. Since no 
restrictions are imposed on the structural relationships among variables, the VARMA can 
be viewed as a flexible approximation to the reduced form of the correctly specified but 
unknown model of the actual economic structure. Considering that the large-scale 
structural models are very often misspecified, it seems to be appealing to use the
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VARMA for the purpose of stylizing empirical regularities among time-series data. 
VARMA models forecasting time-series variables have recently been shown to be much 
more accurate than the more simple VAR (vector autoregressive) models alone. 
Athanasopoulos (2008). A VAR model was used by Eun and Shim (1989).
The VARMA procedure provides a Granger-Causality test to determine the 
Granger-causal relationships between two distinct groups of variables. It also provides
• infinite order AR representation
• impulse response function (or infinite order MA representation)
• decomposition of the predicted error covariances
• roots of the characteristic functions for both the AR and MA parts to evaluate
the proximity of the roots to the unit circle
• contemporaneous relationships among the components of the vector time series
The Granger-Causality test provides a clear directional linkage between the 
national banking sector indices with the main focus being on the causal linkage between 
the United State banking index and the other eight national banking sector indices. Once 
the nine-nation banking sector VARMA system is estimated, I can trace out the dynamic 
responses of each of the nine indices to innovations in a particular index using the 
simulated responses of the estimated VARMA system. This provides a persistence or 
strength of the linkage among the linkages.
The state space procedure is a suitable methodology for finding the best (in the 
Granger causality sense) relationship among the above variables. The procedure has two 
important attributes found lacking in similar methodologies. One advantage is that the 
state space procedure makes no a priori assumptions about variable relationships, but
relies upon the data in identifying causal relationships. Stated differently, the procedure 
allows a test of the hypothesized relationships without imposing a structural model on the 
data prior to estimation. In contrast, autoregressive moving average (ARMA) and vector 
autoregressive moving average (VARMA) models developed by Tiao and Box (1981) 
require the researcher to tentatively specify the model before estimation. As compared to 
the state space procedure, VARMA is unnecessarily restrictive when the direction of 
causal relationships is uncertain.
A second advantage of the procedure is that it can be used to obtain the minimum 
number of parameters necessary to span the state space o f the time invariant linear 
relationship, which best describes a given set of observations. In other words, state space 
models are parsimonious. Additionally, Watson (1989) argues that, in state space 
modeling, the constraint that the model places on the data is transparent.- He also asserts- 
that in state space modeling, an algebraic solution to the model is unnecessary since the 
model is easily solved recursively by Kalman filter. Aoki and Havenner (1989) maintain 
that the state space modeling is superior since there is no need for the judgmental model- 
selection rules employed by other methods (e.g. ARMA).
The methodology for constructing state space models consists of three steps (see 
Aoki and Havenner 1991). The first step is fitting a multivariate autoregressive (AR) 
model with k lags (AR(k)). This study uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with 
k=l,...10 to find a definitive starting point for the Yule-Walker equations.1
1 The Akaike Information Criterion considers the relationship between k-lags in the initial Yule-Walker 
equations, where k=l,...n , and the resulting autocovariances in selecting an optimal starting point for the 
initial sample period [See Akaike (1976)]. The optimal k-lag structure is that which minimizes the 
equations' prediction error relative to the number o f  parameters used.
14
The initial' measurement equation relates an m x 1 state space vector, qt, to the 
multivariate time series, yt:
Yt = Htqt + dt + Ot8t t=l,..,T (l)
where Ht is an n x m transition matrix , dt is an n x 1 vector, and <o, is an n x 1 vector of 
serially uncorrelated disturbances, E(et) = 0, While the state vector <;t spans the time 
series, the distributional properties of yt are largely unknown, making parameter 
estimation difficult. Some properties may be ascertained by decomposing the state 
vector's prediction error.
In the final step of the methodology, the Kalman filter (i.e., forward recursion 
algorithms) is used to compute the one-step-ahead prediction error, (Dt, and its 
corresponding covariance matrix. This information is used in constructing an appropriate 
likelihood function (see Diebold (1989) for a more complete discussion of this approach). 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is then used to derive final parameter estimates 
for the state space model. The state space estimates are then converted to VARMA form 
to facilitate interpretation of the results.2
4.2 DATA SAMPLE
Keeping in the spirit of the core study of linkages as examined in Eun and Shim 
(1989), this study concentrates on a number of the world’s largest banking sectors as
2 A ll vector ARMA models can be expressed in state space form. Aoki and Havenner (1991) show that the 
Cayley-Hamilton theorem can be invoked to eliminate states and convert state space m odels to ARMA  
m odels. The m ethod  involves recursive substitution o f th e  lag (back shift) operator matrix and produces a 
num ber o f lags in all param eters.
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determined by Thomson Reuters which is based on aggregate bank assets within the 
respective countries. In Eun and Shim (1989), they selected and analyzed the nine 
countries with the largest stock market indices based on market capitalization at the time.
Using The Banker magazine published by Thomson Reuters I selected the same 
nine countries for this study. Eight of the nine countries from Eun and Shim (1989) are 
the largest banking sector countries today with Canada being the lone exception. Canada 
is still included due to its close ties to the US banking sector and strong intra-regional 
ties. Here, as in Eun and Shim (1989), I use the major banking indices traded in each 
country as a proxy for the banking sector from the respective country. This is to 
minimize the individual banking requirements that are imposed in the various banking 
jurisdictions, as well as focusing on the overall sectors instead of individual banks.
These banking sectors are: U.K., Germany, France and Switzerland representing 
Europe; Japan, Hong Kong and Australia representing the Pacific Rim; and Canada and 
the U.S. representing North America. Each country banking sector is represented by a 
equity banking index as a proxy for that country specific banking sector. U.K. (FTSE 
All-Share Bank Index), Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price Index), France (Euronex 
Paris CAC Bank 8350), Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index), Japan (Japan TOPIX 
Banks), Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index), Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking 
Index), Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks), and the U.S. (S&P 500 Banks).
The database used in this study consists of time series of daily national banking 
sector indices at closing time, in terms of local currency units. The nine national banking 
sector indices daily closing data were obtained from the Global Financial Data database
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for the entire period beginning January 4, 1999 and ending September 24, 2010. The 
sample was limited to the time frame in which all of the nine national banking sector 
indices were in existence and traded in a public market. There were a total of 3,054 daily 
closes for each of the national banking sector indices for the inclusive period of January 
4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
Additionally, the data samples were broken down to include the entire period 
prior to the financial crisis on September 15, 2008 and the two-year time frame after the 
financial crisis. The time frame included prior to the financial crisis date of September 
15, 2008 runs from January 4, 1999 through September 12, 2008 (September 12, 2008 
was a Friday). This first time frame consisted of 2,525 daily closes for each of the 
national banking sector indices. The second time frame included the two years after the 
financial crisis date of September 15, 2008 which included September 15, 2008 through 
September 14, 2010. The second time frame consisted of 529 daily closes for each of 
the national banking sector indices. The statistical analysis of the immediate two-year 
time frame prior to the financial crisis was substantially similar to the inclusive time 
period prior to the financial crisis. Although this inclusive time frame is much larger in 
comparison to the limited two-year time frame that followed the financial crisis, this only 
adds robustness to the analysis.
One issue that was addressed regarding the daily close across nine different 
national banking sector indices was differing trading days. In other words, not all 
national banking sector indices or national securities markets in which they are traded are 
traded on a daily basis due to varying national holiday schedules. Therefore, to provide 
for adequate comparisons of indices in this study there were some minor transformations
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made to the raw daily close data of the national banking sector indices included in the 
inclusive periods. For any day that any of the national banking sector indices was traded 
and therefore provided a daily close, then all of the other indices must also have a daily 
close. This was to ensure the same number of daily closes across all nine national 
banking sector indices.
In other words, when national stock exchanges were closed due to national 
holiday, banking holiday, severe weather, or other national emergency or event, the 
national banking sector index was assumed to remain the same as the previous active 
trading day close.
For example, the U.S. national securities markets as well as various other national 
securities markets are closed on December 25 of each year but the Japanese national 
securities markets are open. Therefore, since the national banking sector index for Japan 
has an actual daily close for December 25th the other national banking sector indices 
must also have a daily close for December 25th. The solution is to assume the daily close 
for the US national banking sector index on December 24th and use that daily close for 
the following day of December 25th.
These national banking sector indices are then transformed to log of daily rates of 
return as well as log of return volatility (daily returns squared), which are then used in 
our VARMA, Granger-Causality, and State Space analysis. Any potential problems 
associated with non-stationarity in the original banking sector indices can be alleviated by 
using the transformed data. There is a non-synchronous trading problem. Differences in 
trading times, whether national securities markets are open and trading in contrast with
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other national securities markets, and crossing of various time zones.
***Insert Table 1 here, Summary Statistics for Residual Returns***
Table 1 provides a listing of the nine national banking sector indices by country, a 
detailed description of the nine indices variables as well as the summary statistics of the 
residual returns variables for the nine indices that were used for the empirical test using 
Granger-Causality, VARMA and State Space modeling in this study. As can be clearly 
seen in this table, the U.S. national banking sector index for residual daily returns 
exhibited the lowest mean return while Canada exhibited the highest mean return during 
the overall period of this study.
***Insert Table 2 here, Summary Statistics for Returns Volatility***
Table 2 provides a listing of the nine national banking sector indices by country, a 
detailed description of the nine indices variables as well as the summary statistics of the 
returns volatility variables for the nine indices that were used for the empirical test using 
Granger-Causality, VARMA and State Space modeling in this study. As can be clearly 
seen in this table, the U.S. national banking sector index for daily return volatility 
exhibited the highest daily return volatility while Australia exhibited the lowest daily 
return volatility during the overall period of this study.
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I limited the lag length of this empirical VARMA analysis in this study to three 
lags or three trading days. Although this study of national banking sector indices is not 
an exact comparison of Eun and Shim (1989) its striking similarity noted in the lag length 
is evident. Eun and Shim (1989) found evidence of feedback to current stock market 
index returns of up to 3 trading days or 3 lags. Here, over 30 years later, although 
analyzing a different set of indices, I found no significant feedback of returns between 
indices greater than 3 lags or 3 trading days. Therefore, all of the statistical analysis and 
results are based on the VARMA with lag of 3 trading days. This in and of itself is 
something to be noted.
5.1 RESIDUAL RETURNS
I empirically test here the residual returns time series on a pairwise basis between 
the U.S. national banking sector index and the other eight major banking center countries 
respectively.
***Insert Table 3 here, Correlation Matrix for Residual Returns***
Table 3 shows the results of the contemporaneous correlations of the residual 
returns among the nine national banking sector indices. There are no surprises here. 
Table 3 shows, as in Eun and Shim (1989) regarding national stock markets, the intra- 
regional pairwise correlation of the nine country indices of returns tend to be much higher
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than those of inter-regional correlations. The four European country national banking 
indices consisting of France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K., exhibit very high 
pairwise contemporaneous correlations ranging from .67842 to .73978. Also the 
respective Pacific Rim national banking sector indices o f Australia, Hong Kong and 
Japan exhibit likewise, very high pairwise contemporaneous correlations ranging from 
.34301 to .43532. Although the correlations of the Pacific Rim countries are lower than 
those of the European countries, they are still statistically significant.
As was also expected, the Canadian and the U.S. national banking sector indices 
for returns showed a higher contemporaneous correlation of .53147. Additionally, the 
U.S. national banking sector index had a much higher contemporaneous correlation with 
the four European countries in this study ranging from .35757 to .40695 compared to the 
correlations with the three Pacific Rim countries which ranged from .0317 with Japan to 
.09045 of Australia. This could be attributed to several factors such as correspondingly 
similar trading times due to common time zones as well as closeness or integration of the 
intra-regional economies.
The pairwise contemporaneous correlations of the nine country national banking 
sector indices for returns of this study are much higher than was found in the study of the 
linkages of the national stock markets by Eun and Shim (1989). This indicates that the 
banking sectors are highly correlated on a global scale. This provides initial evidence 
that the global banking community is linked and is influenced by as well as influences 
other national banking sectors. This lends initial support to hypothesis one in this study 
that there are linkages among the nine largest national banking sectors regardless of 
differences in national banking regulations.
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5.2 CAUSATION AND DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE OF RESIDUAL RETURNS
The Granger-Causality Wald test is used in this study to provide evidence of 
causal connections between the U.S. national banking sector and the other eight country 
national banking sectors. This test of directional causation or influence is used as a 
pairwise analysis, comparing the U.S. national banking sector index to the other country 
national banking sector indices individually. This analysis provides evidence supporting 
the second hypothesis of whether the U.S. national banking sector is a leader, follower or 
contemporaneously influenced sector compared to the other major national banking 
sectors respectively. Table 4 through table 6 show the results of the Granger-Causality 
Wald test as a part of the VARMA analysis.
***Insert Table 4 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
Pacific Rim Countries***
Table 4 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between the U.S. national 
banking sector index for returns and the three respective Pacific Rim countries of 
Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan respectively. The null hypothesis for Granger- 
Causality test is that the first variable (Australia) is influenced by itself not by the second 
variable (U.S.). The null hypothesis is rejected for all cases in this table. Panel A 
indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index influences each of the respective 
Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices as evidenced by the extremely high 
Chi-Square for each country for the entire period of this study all o f which were 
statistically significant, January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010. Panel B also 
shows similar results for the period prior to the financial crisis. This period is from the
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beginning of the data sample of January .4, 1999 through September 12, 2008. The entire 
period prior to the financial crises date o f September 15, 2008 and not just the two years 
prior was used since the time period provided similar results as the two years only and 
using the entire period therefore increase the robustness of the statistical results.
Continuing with Table 4 , 1 compare the Granger-Causality test results in Panel B, 
results for the entire period prior to the financial crisis, to Panel C results for the period 
after the financial crisis from September 15, 2008 through September 14, 2010. 
Although the directional evidence is the same throughout the three periods showing that 
the US national banking sector index for returns influence over the three respective 
Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices, they in turn fail to show any 
reciprocal feedback influence over the U.S. banking sector. The directional influence of 
the U.S. national banking sector index over the three Pacific Rim country national 
banking sector indices also appears to be weaker after the financial crisis as indicated by 
the substantially lower Chi-Square.
The Chi-square for testing Granger-Causality between the U.S. national banking 
sector index for returns and the Australian counterpart went from 490.08 for the period 
prior to the financial crisis down to 118.45 for the period after the financial crisis, both 
are statistically significant. There is a similar change in the Chi-square seen for testing 
Granger-Causality between the U.S. national banking sector index for returns and Hong 
Kong dropping from 502.81 prior to the financial crisis to 98.97 afterwards as well as 
Japan dropping from 152.30 prior to the financial crisis down to 88.97 afterwards. Both 
of these remain statistically significant.
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. *** Insert Table 5 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries***
Table 5 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between the U.S. national 
banking sector index and the four respective European countries of France, Germany, 
Switzerland, and the U.K. As with prior analysis above, Panel A provides the results for 
the inclusive period, Panel B provides the results for the entire period prior to the 
financial crisis, and Panel C provides the results regarding the two-year period 
immediately after the financial crisis. The evidence of the U.S. national banking sector 
directional influence over the four European national banking sector is supported by the 
extremely large Chi-Square for all by the Granger-Causality tests in both Panel A, the 
entire study period as well as Panel B, the entire period prior to the financial crisis. Also 
of note, as with the Pacific Rim country national banking sectors, none of the four 
European country national banking sectors indicate directional influence over the US 
national banking sector. However, as seen in the previous analysis of the Pacific Rim 
countries, the U.S. directional influence is still evident during the two-years after the 
financial crisis and as with the prior analysis, the U.S. national banking sector influence 
over the four European national banking sectors appears to weaken during this period.
As observed with the change in Chi-square for the Granger-Causality test between 
the US national banking sector index for returns and the Pacific Rim countries, there is a 
notable change in the Chi-square in the Granger-Causality measure between the US 
national banking sector index for returns and the four European banking center countries 
in this study. The Chi-square dropped from the period prior to the financial crisis as 
compared to the period observed after the financial crisis for all four European countries.
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France dropped from 409.20 down to 33.21, Germany from 176.91 down to 26.78, 
Switzerland down from 349.88 down to 29.80 and the U.K. from 307.31 down to 37.90. 
All remained statistically significant however.
***Insert Table 6 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
North America***
Table 6 shows the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test between the U.S. 
national banking sector index for returns and the national banking sector index for returns 
of Canada. There is no surprise here due to their close intra-regional ties. The U.S. 
national banking sector index clearly influences the Canadian national banking sector 
index for the inclusive data sample period, the entire period prior to the financial crisis as 
well as the period after the financial crisis as seen in Panel A, B, and C in Table 6 
respectively. The Chi-Square was visibly lower as seen in Panel C of table 4 and table 5 
after the financial crisis for the U.S. national banking sector influence over the three 
Pacific Rim countries as well as the four European countries national banking sectors 
respectively. However, Panel C of table 6 shows that the Chi-Square indicating causation 
of the U.S. national banking sector influence on the Canadian national banking sector 
increases after the financial crisis. These results also show that the Canadian national 
banking sector does not influence the U.S. national banking sector.
Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported from the evidence found in the Granger- 
Causality tests above. The U.S. national banking sector has a statistically significant 
directional influence on all eight of the other national banking center country sector 
indices for returns in this study. Although it appears that the strength of this directional
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influence does dramatically weaken over the three Pacific Rim and four European 
countries after the financial crisis occurs, evidence shows that it increases over the 
Canadian banking sector.
5.3 PERSISTENCE OF LINKAGE AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF RESIDUAL
RETURNS
After determining the causal influence, the next step is to analyze the persistence 
of actual strength of the causal influence the U.S. national banking sector has over the 
other eight national banking center country sectors in this study. Table 7 and Table 10 
are included for additional information for the inclusive period of analysis and are not 
significantly different from that of those of the inclusive period prior to the financial 
crisis. Therefore, I will focus on the comparison between the strength of influence prior 
to the financial crisis to that after the financial crisis and evaluate the changes between 
these two periods.
***Insert Table 7 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall
Period, Asia-Pacific Countries***
Findings provided in Table 7 of the U.S. national banking sector influence over 
the Pacific Rim national banking center countries for the entire period of my study. The 
U.S. exerts influence for a full three days over Australia, two days over Hong Kong but 
only one day over Japan. These findings are all statistically significant.
***Insert Table 8 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior 
to Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***
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Table 8 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector persistence of influence 
over the Australian and Hong Kong national banking sectors lasts for a full three trading 
days for the period prior to the financial crisis. This is statistically significant out to three 
trading days prior to the financial crisis but lasts only one trading day for the Japanese 
national banking sector. These findings are very similar to the findings in Table 7 for the 
entire period of this study.
***Insert Table 9 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for 
Period after Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***
In Table 9, the findings indicate significant changes regarding the strength of 
influence by the U.S. national banking sector over the Pacific Rim countries after the 
financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector strength persists for only one trading 
day over the Australian national banking sector for the period after the financial crisis, 
down from three trading days prior to the financial crisis. The U.S. national banking 
sector persistence over the Hong Kong national banking sector drops to two trading days 
for the period after the financial crisis compared to three trading days for the period prior 
to the financial crisis. Lastly, the U.S. national banking sector remained unchanged at 
one trading day of influence over the Japanese national banking sector for the period after 
the financial crisis.
***Insert Table 10 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall
Period, European Countries***
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The findings in Table 10 provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sectors 
influence over the four European national banking center countries for the entire period 
of the study. The U.S. exerts a full two days of influence over all four of the European 
countries in this study for the inclusive period of this study.
***Insert Table 11 here, Model Parameter Estimates o f Residual Returns for Period Prior
to Financial Crisis, European Countries***
Table 11 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector influence persists for two 
trading days over the French and the U.K. national banking sectors but only for one 
trading day over the Swiss and German national banking sectors prior to the financial 
crisis. This is significantly similar to the results for the inclusive period of this study. 
However, the U.S. national banking sector influence is down to only one trading day for 
all four European country national banking sectors as indicated from the results in Table 
12.
***Insert Table 12 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after 
the Financial Crisis, European Countries***
The U.S. national banking sector persistence or influence over the three Pacific 
Rim country and four European country national banking sectors appears to either remain 
unchanged from the period prior to the financial crisis compared to the period after the 
financial crisis such as for Japan* France, and Switzerland or decreases in influence in the 
case of Australia, Hong Kong, Germany, and the U.K. Canada, however, appears to be
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an entirely different story.
***Insert Table 13 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns,
North American Countries***
The findings in Table 13 provides evidence of the persistence or influence of the 
U.S. national banking sector over the Canadian national banking sector for the inclusive 
period of the study, the entire period prior to the financial crisis and the period after the 
financial crisis as can be seen in Panel, A, B, and C respectively. Panel B shows that the 
influence that the U.S. national banking sector has over the Canadian national banking 
sector for the entire period prior to the financial crisis as merely one trading day. 
However, this influence increases dramatically to three trading days for the period 
immediately after the financial crisis. This is opposite from the reaction that occurred 
with the Pacific Rim and European country national banking sectors. The U.S. national 
banking sector appears to exert more influence over the Canadian national banking sector 
after the financial meltdown occurred on September 15, 2008.
5.4 STATE SPACE ANALYSIS OF RESIDUAL RETURNS
***Insert Table 14 here, State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns for
the Overall Period***
VARMA converted state space results for returns for the overall period are 
reported in Table 14. Equation (1) indicates that Switzerland banks’ return is influenced 
at lag one by Australia, Switzerland, France, United States, Canada, and Japan and 
contemporaneously by Australia. A quick glance at Tables 14 indicates that the U.S. bank
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returns exert the most influence on all of other countries, while in turn, it is influenced by 
Canada and to a small degree by France.
To conserve space, the results for the period before financial crisis are very 
similar to the overall results and thus not reported here. Again, the U.S. is found to exert 
the most influence on all other countries while it is influenced only by a small degree by 
France and Germany.
The results for after the financial crisis indicate that the link between banks stock 
returns have weakened dramatically as the governments took steps to protect their 
financial systems. For instance -  Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia were rarely influenced by the returns of other 
countries -  while Germany and Hong Kong experienced more pronounced influence by 
other countries.3
5.5 RETURNS VOLATILITY
I empirically test here the returns volatility time series on a pairwise basis 
between the US national banking sector index and the other eight major banking center 
countries respectively.
***Insert Table 15 here, Correlation Matrix for Returns Volatility***
In Table 15 I provide the results of the contemporaneous correlations for the 
returns volatility among the nine national banking sector indices. There are some noted
3 Results are available upon request.
differences from my; previous findings for residual returns. Table 16 shows, as in Eun 
and Shim (1989) regarding national stock markets and my previous findings for residual 
returns, the intra-regional pairwise correlation of this nine country indices for return 
volatility tend to be much higher than those of inter-regional correlations. The four 
European country national banking indices consisting of France, Germany, Switzerland, 
and the U.K., exhibit very high pairwise contemporaneous correlations for return 
volatility ranging from .61601 to .65721. Also the respective Pacific Rim national 
banking sector indices of Australia, Hong Kong and Japan exhibit likewise, very high 
pairwise contemporaneous correlations for return volatility ranging from .30882 to 
.33724. Although the correlations of the Pacific Rim countries are lower than those of 
the European countries, they are still statistically significant as was seen for the 
correlation of the residual returns.
As was also expected, the Canadian and the U.S. national banking sector indices 
for return volatility show a high contemporaneous correlation of .38523. This is much 
lower than the returns correlation but is still statistically significant. Additionally, the 
U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility had a much higher 
contemporaneous correlation with the four European countries in this study ranging from 
.33850 to .44023 compared to the correlations with the three Pacific Rim countries which 
ranged from .10573 with Japan to .21347 of Australia. This range is significantly higher 
than that noted for the U.S. and Pacific Rim countries and their contemporaneous 
correlation of returns and is statistically significant. This could be attributed to several 
factors as noted with the contemporaneous correlation of returns such as correspondingly 
similar trading times due to common time zones as well as closeness or integration of the
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intra-regional economies.
The pairwise contemporaneous correlations of the nine country national banking 
sector indices for return volatility as with the returns of this study are much higher than 
was found in the study of the linkages of the national stock markets by Eun and Shim 
(1989). This indicates that the banking sectors are highly correlated on a global scale. 
This provides further evidence that the global banking community is linked and is 
influenced by as well as influences other national banking sectors. This lends initial 
support to hypothesis one in this study that there are linkages among the nine largest 
national banking sectors regardless of differences in national banking regulations.
5.6 CAUSATION AND DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE OF RETURNS
VOLATILITY
The Granger-Causality Wald test is used in this study to provide evidence of 
causal connections between the U.S. national banking sector volatility and the other eight 
country national banking sectors return volatility. This test of directional causation or 
influence is used as a pairwise analysis, comparing the U.S. national banking sector index 
for return volatility to the other country national banking sector indices for volatility 
individually. This analysis provides evidence supporting the second hypothesis of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector is a leader, a laggard or contemporaneously 
influenced sector compared to the other major national banking sectors respectively. 
Table 17 through table 19 provides the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test as a 
part of the VARMA analysis.
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***Insert Table 16 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
Pacific Rim Countries***
The findings in Table 16 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between 
the U.S. national banking sector index for returns volatility and the three respective 
Pacific Rim countries of Australia, Hong Kong, and Japan respectively. Panel A 
provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility 
influences each of the respective Pacific Rim country national banking sector indices for 
return volatility as noted by the Chi-Square for each country, all of which are statistically 
significant for the entire period of this study, January 4, 1999 through September 24, 
2010 .
It is interesting to note that the findings for return volatility that all three Pacific 
Rim countries also influence the U.S. return volatility. Unlike the returns alone where 
the US national banking sector influenced these countries but not vice versa, here I find 
that the return volatility is a complete feedback loop, a reciprocity of influence with 
return volatility.
Panel B also shows similar results for the period prior to the financial crisis. This 
period is from the beginning of the data sample of January 4, 1999 through September 
12, 2008. The entire period prior to the financial crises date of September 15, 2008 and 
not just the two years prior was used since the time period provided similar results as the 
two years only and using the entire period therefore increase the robustness of the 
statistical results.
Continuing with Table 16, I compare the Granger-Causality Wald test results for
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return volatility in Panel B, results for return volatility of the entire period prior to the 
financial crisis, to Panel C results for the period after the financial crisis from September 
15, 2008 through September 14, 2010. Although the directional evidence is the same 
throughout the overall period as well as the period showing that the U.S. national banking 
sector index influence over the three respective Pacific Rim country national banking 
sector indices and vice versa, the three Pacific Rim countries exerting directional 
influence over the U.S. return volatility. The directional influence of the U.S. national 
banking sector index for return volatility over the three Pacific Rim country national 
banking sector indices appears to disappear after the financial crisis except for its 
directional influence over Australia. Any directional influence by the three Pacific Rim 
countries over the U.S. national banking sector regarding return volatility has completely 
disappeared.
***Insert Table 17 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Return Volatility,
European Countries***
The findings in Table 17 shows the Granger-Causality Wald test results between 
the U.S. national banking sector index return volatility and the four respective European 
countries of France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K. As with prior analysis above, 
Panel A provides the results for the inclusive period, Panel B provides the results for the 
entire period prior to the financial crisis, and Panel C provides the results regarding the 
two-year period immediately after the financial crisis. The evidence of the U.S. national 
banking sector return volatility directional influence over the other four European 
national banking sector is evidenced by the Granger-Causality tests Chi-Square that is
statistically significant for all in both Panel A, the entire study period as well as Panel B, 
the entire period prior to the financial crisis. Also noted, as with the Pacific Rim country 
national banking sectors return volatility, all four of the European country national 
banking sectors indicate directional influence over the U.S. national banking sector as 
well. This indicates a more contemporaneous influence of return volatility among the 
U.S. and European countries as I found among the U.S. and Pacific Rim countires. 
However, as seen in the previous analysis of the Pacific Rim countries, the U.S. 
directional influence as well as the European countries directional influence over the U.S. 
all but disappears during the period immediately after the financial crisis. The exception 
is the U.S. still has some direction influence over France and the U.K. while the U.K. still 
has directional influence over the U.S.
***Insert Table 18 here, Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
North America***
The findings in Table 18 show the results of the Granger-Causality Wald test 
between the U.S. national banking sector index of return volatility and the national 
banking sector index of return volatility for Canada. There is no surprise here due to 
their close intra-regional ties. As noted regarding directional influences between the U.S. 
and the Pacific Rim countries along with the U.S. and the European countries, the U.S. 
national banking sector index of return volatility clearly influences the Canadian national 
banking sector index of return volatility as well as vice versa, a contemporaneous 
directional influence if you will, for the inclusive data sample period, the entire period 
prior to the financial crisis as well as the period after the financial crisis as seen in Panel
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A, B, and C in Table 18 respectively.
The directional influence of the U.S. diminished greatly as seen in Panel C of 
table 16 and table 17 after the financial crisis for the U.S. national banking sector 
influence over the three Pacific Rim countries as well as the four European countries 
national banking sectors respectively. However, Panel C of table 18 shows that the Chi- 
Square indicating causation of the U.S. national banking sector influence on the Canadian 
national banking sector remains statistically significant after the financial crisis. These 
results also show that the Canadian national banking sector index of return volatility does 
influence the U.S. national banking sector during all three periods of observation.
Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported from the evidence found in the Granger- 
Causality tests above. The U.S. national banking sector has a statistically significant 
directional influence on all eight of the other national banking sectors in this study. 
Although it appears that the strength of this directional influence does dramatically 
weaken against the three Pacific Rim and four European countries after the financial 
crisis occurs, evidence shows that it remains statistically significant over the Canadian 
banking sector.
5.7 PERSISTENCE OF LINKAGE AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF RETURNS
VOLATILITY
After determining the causal influence, the next step is to analyze the persistence 
of actual strength of the causal influence the U.S. national banking sector has over the 
other eight national banking sectors in this study. Table 19 and Table 22 are included for 
additional information for the inclusive period of analysis. However, I will focus on the
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comparison between the strength of influence prior to the financial crisis to that after the 
financial crisis and evaluate the changes between these two periods.
***Insert Table 19 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall
Period, Pacific Rim Countries***
Table 19 provides evidence that the U.S. national banking sector index of return 
volatility has influence over Australia and Japan that is statistically significant for one 
day and three days but only for one day over Hong Kong for the overall period of this 
study. This is slightly different from the observed findings when evaluating only the 
period prior to the financial crisis. These results are similar to the results found for the 
VARMA pariwise analysis between the U.S. national banking sector index for return 
volatility and the three respective Pacific Rim countries.
***Insert Table 20 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period 
Prior to Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***
Table 20 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility 
persistence of influence over the Hong Kong and Japan national banking sectors lasts a 
full trading day. This is statistically significant out to three trading days prior to the 
financial crisis but has statistically significant influence over Australia for one and three 
trading days, but not for the second trading day.
***Insert Table 21 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for 
Period after Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries***
The findings in Table :21 show significant changes regarding the strength of
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influence by the U.S. national banking sector for return volatility over the Pacific Rim 
countries after the financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector index for return 
volatility strength persists for only one trading day over the Australian national banking 
sector for the period after the financial crisis, down from two trading days prior to the 
financial crisis. The U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility persistence 
over the Hong Kong and Japan national banking sectors disappears altogether for the 
period after the financial crisis compared to one trading day for the period prior to the 
financial crisis.
***Insert Table 22 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall
Period, European Countries***
Table 22 provides results for the entire period of study for the VARMA pairwise 
analysis between the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility and the four 
European countries respectively. Unlike the pairwise analysis between the U.S. national 
banking sector and the three Pacific Rim countries where there was little significant 
differences between the overall period and the less inclusive period prior to the financial 
crisis. Here there are some differences that appear between the US national banking 
sector index for return volatility and the four European countries when comparing the 
overall period of observation and the period prior to the financial crisis.
During the overall period, the U.S. national banking sector index for return 
volatility has a statistically significant influence over France, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
for one trading period as well as the third trading day but not for the second trading day.
I observed that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility has no
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measurable influence over the German banking sector during this same time frame.
***Insert Table 23, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries***
Table 23 indicates that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility 
statistically significantly influence persists for two trading days over the French and the 
U.K. national banking sectors but only for one trading day for the Swiss and German 
national banking sectors prior to the financial crisis. However, the U.S. national banking 
sector index for return volatility greatly diminishes influence down to only one trading 
day for the U.K. national banking sector and has completely disappeared over Germany, 
France, and Switzerland as can be seen from the results in Table 24.
***Insert Table 24 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries***
The U.S. national banking sector persistence or influence over the three Pacific 
Rim country and four European country national banking sectors appears to either 
diminish substantially from the period prior to the financial crisis compared to the period 
after the financial crisis such as for Australia and the U.K. or completely disappears in 
the case of Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, France, and Switzerland. Canada, however, 
appears to be an entirely different story.
***Insert Table 25 here, Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility,
North America***
39
Table 25 provides the results of the persistence or influence of the U.S. national 
banking sector index for return volatility over the Canadian national banking sector for 
the inclusive period of the study, the entire period prior to the financial crisis and the 
period after the financial crisis as can be seen in Panel, A, B, and C respectively. It 
should be noted that the U.S. national banking sector index for return volatility influence 
over the Canadian banking sector for the overall period as seen in Panel A is similar to 
what was found with three of the European country banking sector, where the U.S. has 
statistically significant influence over Canada for one and three trading days but not the 
second trading day.
Panel B shows that the influence that the U.S. national banking sector index for 
return volatility has over the Canadian national banking sector for the entire period prior 
to the financial crisis as merely one trading day. This influence remains one trading day 
for the period immediately after the financial crisis also. The U.S. national banking 
sector index for return volatility appears to exert the same influence over the Canadian 
national banking sector after the financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008. I can 
only speculate that this is due to the extremely close ties of the U.S. and Canadian 
banking sectors.
5.8 STATE SPACE ANALYSIS OF RETURNS VOLATILITY
***Insert Table 26, State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns Volatility
for the Overall Period***
VARMA converted state space results for returns volatility for the overall period 
are reported in Table 26. The results reported in this table indicate extensive volatility 
spillovers from countries studied here. For instance, equation (5) indicates that the U.S. 
bank returns volatility is influenced at lag one by Australia, Switzerland, the U.K., 
Canada, Hong Kong, and contemporaneously by Australia. The results for the period 
before financial crisis are very similar to the overall results and thus not reported here. 
Again, we observe extensive volatility spillovers among the countries for this period. 
However, the results for after the financial crisis are quite different. The volatility 
spillovers are very much contained during this period. For instance, the U.S. bank returns 
volatility was not affected by any other countries. We observe the same phenomenon for 
all countries except Germany and Hong Kong that experience limited volatility spillover 
after the financial crisis.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUTION
The U.S. national banking sector index for returns as well as return volatility are 
highly correlated with the other eight major national banking sectors around the globe. 
However, the highest pairwise contemporaneous correlations among national banking 
sectors were intra-regional as opposed to inter-regional. This could be one of a number 
of factors two of which could be similar time-zones that the country banking sector 
indices are trading in as well as a more integrated economic trading within the respective 
regions.
The U.S. still is the dominate player in the global financial markets exerting its 
influence on all eight of the major banking sectors around the globe. However, since the 
financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008, there is evidence that the U.S. influence 
has weakened somewhat since then except the the neighbors to the north, Canada. 
Canada is the smallest of the banking sectors in this study as well as the closest regionally 
to the U.S .banking sector with extremely deep economic ties.
My findings in this study confirms as well as brings to light several interesting 
results. Although the major global bank sectors around the world appear to be linked as 
was hypothesized, the U.S. banking sector is a global leader and influences other major 
banking sectors around the world with regards to returns. However, risk as measured by 
return volatility, provides evidence of a more contemporaneous link between the U.S. and 
the other eight major global banking sectors.
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Additionally, even though all of the nine major global banking sector countries 
are signatories of and in various stages of implementing the numerous Basel accords, 
each of these countries have the governmental power or authority to regulate their 
respective banking sectors. I speculate here that this autonomous authority had an impact 
on the changes regarding the measured impact of the U.S. national banking sector 
immediately following the global financial crisis.
From my findings it appears that the U.S. national banking sector has a strong and 
long lasting influence on the other eight major global banking sector countries as 
measured by returns when the financial landscape is calm. However, the U.S. influence 
appears to evaporate when a financial crisis occurs. Further study could measure to 
determine empirically whether there is a return of the U.S. banking sector influence and 
is there is, at what point does the U.S. banking sector influence return.
This dissertation adds to the literature in several ways as well as raising more 
avenues for further research. A short coming of this study is the examining the actual 
governmental actions and the timing of these actions that were taken immediately after 
the financial crisis to determine whether those governmental actions or lack of actions in 
some cases caused the breakdown in linkages between the U.S. national banking sector 
and the other major banking sectors around the globe.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Residual Returns
aul swl ge l  frl ukl usl cal hkl jal
■ ■ mam
3054 0 .0 2 0 0 8 1 .3 4 1 1 7 6 1 .3 1 9 6 4 -8 .5 1 6 5 8 9 .6 8 9 3 1
3054 -0 .0 0 5 2 6 2 .0 5 8 9 5 -1 6 .0 5 8 3 8 -1 2 .1 1 1 9 0 1 9 .7 3 8 3 6
3054 -0 .0 2 2 6 6 2 .3 6 1 1 5 -6 9 .2 0 3 8 5 -1 7 .7 4 3 7 4 1 8 .7 1 7 6 8
S B 3054 0 .0 1 2 9 1 2 .1 5 7 2 5 3 9 .4 1 8 9 4 -1 4 .7 8 7 0 0 1 9 .2 4 3 7 3
3054 -0 .0 1 2 9 8 1 .9 8 8 5 2 -3 9 .6 5 4 0 6 -1 6 .9 7 6 9 9 1 8 .8 1 6 3 5
B i 3054 -0 .0 2 9 0 2 2 .4 9 8 9 3 -8 8 .6 1 9 3 3 -2 3 .6 1 8 5 5 2 2 .0 3 7 8 6
30 5 4 0 .0 3 0 3 5 1 .4 3 4 6 9 9 2 .6 7 5 3 0 -1 4 .0 7 1 1 6 1 2 .1 3 3 9 9
3054 0 .0 2 8 7 2 1 .6 0 9 2 0 8 7 .7 1 2 9 1 -1 4 .5 3 8 4 4 1 5 .9 7 3 9 5
30 5 4 -0 .0 3 2 8 9 2 .0 3 1 6 3 -1 0 0 .4 3 0 8 8 -1 3 .3 4 9 8 2 1 4 .1 9 3 2 1
Note: Nine variable descriptions.
aul = Log of daily returns for Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index) 
swl = Log of daily returns for Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index) 
gel = Log of daily returns for Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price Index) 
frl = Log of daily returns for France (Euronex Paris CAC Bank 8350) 
ukl = Log of daily returns for United Kingdom (FTSE All-Share Bank Index) 
usl = Log of daily returns for United States (S&P 500 Banks) 
cal = Log of daily returns for Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks) 
hkl = Log of daily returns for Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index) 
ja l = Log of daily returns for Japan (Japan TOPIX Banks)
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Returns Volatility
sw2 ge2 fr2 uk2 us2 ca2 hk2 ja2
91
3 0 5 4 1 .7 9 8 5 6 5 .1 3 6 6 8 5 4 9 3 0 9 3 .8 8 2 8 1
3 0 5 4 4 .2 3 7 9 3 1 4 .2 4 0 9 9 1 2 9 4 3 0 3 8 9 .6 0 2 7 6
9 9 3 0 5 4 5 .5 7 3 7 3 1 9 .6 4 9 0 9 1 7 0 2 2 0 3 5 0 .3 5 1 5 4
3 0 5 4 4 .6 5 2 3 6 1 5 .9 2 6 0 5 1 4 2 0 8 0 3 7 0 .3 2 0 9 8
3 0 5 4 3 .9 5 3 0 7 1 4 .0 9 0 5 2 1 2 0 7 3 0 3 5 4 .0 5 4 9 5
^^9 3 0 5 4 6 .2 4 3 4 3 2 7 .6 1 6 0 1 1 9 0 6 7 0 5 5 7 .8 3 6 1 2^^9 3 0 5 4 2 .0 5 8 5 8 7 .1 5 9 3 5 6 2 8 7 0 1 9 7 .9 9 7 4 4
9 1 3 0 5 4 2 .5 8 9 5 0 9 .5 0 8 9 5 7 9 0 8 0 2 5 5 .1 6 7 1 3
1191 3 0 5 4 4 .1 2 7 2 3 1 0 .3 6 4 8 4 1 2 6 0 5 0 2 0 1 .4 4 7 2 6
Note: Nine variable descriptions.
au2 = Log of daily return volatility for Australia (S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index)
sw2 = Log of daily return volatility for Switzerland (SWXICB Bank Price Index)
ge2 = Log of daily return volatility for Germany (Germany CD AX Banks Price 
Index)
fr2 = Log of daily return volatility for France (Euronex Paris CAC Bank 8350)
uk2 = Log of daily return volatility for United Kingdom (FTSE All-Share Bank 
Index)
us2 = Log of daily return volatility for United States (S&P 500 Banks) 
ca2 = Log of daily return volatility for Canada (Canada S&P/TSX Banks) 
hk2 = Log of daily return volatility for Hong Kong (Hang Seng Financial Index) 
ja2 = Log of daily return volatility for Japan (Japan TOPIX Banks)
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix for Residual Returns
■■ BBB3
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 1 5 6 4
< .0001
0 .2 8 6 1 1
< .0001
0 .3 2 3 5 0
< .0001
0 .2 9 9 9 1
< .0 0 0 1
0 .0 9 0 4 5
< .0 0 0 1
0 .1 6 9 5 5
< .0001
0 .4 3 5 3 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 4 3 0 1
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 1 5 6 4
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .7 3 9 7 8
< .0 0 0 1
0 .6 8 8 7 3
< .0001
0 .7 0 7 3 0
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 7 9 1 7
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 9 4 4 8
< .0001
0 .3 3 9 3 7
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 6 9 5 1
< .0001
B 0 .2 8 6 1 1< .0001 0 .7 3 9 7 8< .0001 1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .7 1 6 3 5< .0 0 0 1 0 .6 9 9 8 8< .0 0 0 1 0 .4 0 6 9 5< .0 0 0 1 0 .3 8 5 5 2< .0001 0 .2 9 7 9 6< .0 0 0 1 0 .2 4 1 4 8< .0 0 0 1
u 0 .3 2 3 5 0< .0001 0 .6 8 8 7 3< .0001 0 .7 1 6 3 5< .0001 1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .6 7 8 4 2< .0 0 0 1 0 .3 5 7 5 7< .0 0 0 1 0 .3 0 4 0 5< .0001 0 .3 3 1 9 6< .0 0 0 1 0 .2 3 4 0 3< .0001
0 .2 9 9 9 1
< .0001
0 .7 0 7 3 0
< .0001
0 .6 9 9 8 8
< .0001
0 .6 7 8 4 2
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 8 9 7 1
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 7 4 1 7
< .0001
0 .3 7 6 3 1
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 3 3 3 6
< .0001
0 .0 9 0 4 5
< .0001
0 .3 7 9 1 7
< .0001
0 .4 0 6 9 5
< .0001
0 .3 5 7 5 7
< .0001
0 .3 8 9 7 1
< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .5 3 1 4 7
< .0001
0 .0 7 7 9 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .0 3 1 7 0
0 .0 7 9 8n 0 .1 6 9 5 5
< .0001
0 .3 9 4 4 8
< .0001
0 .3 8 5 5 2
< .0001
0 .3 0 4 0 5
< .0001
0 .3 7 4 1 7
< .0 0 0 1
0 .5 3 1 4 7
< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 9 8 9 9
< .0 0 0 1
0 .1 4 0 5 7
< .0001
0 .4 3 5 3 2
< .0001
0 .3 3 9 3 7
< .0001
0 .2 9 7 9 6
< .0001
0 .3 3 1 9 6
< .0001
0 .3 7 6 3 1
< .0 0 0 1
0 .0 7 7 9 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .1 9 8 9 9
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 9 8 7 1
< .00011 0 .3 4 3 0 1
< .0001
0 .2 6 9 5 1
< .0001
0 .2 4 1 4 8
< .0001
0 .2 3 4 0 3
< .0001
0 .2 3 3 3 6
< .0 0 0 1
0 .0 3 1 7 0
0 .0 7 9 8
.......................... . J
0 .1 4 0 5 7
< .0001
0 .3 9 8 7 1
< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0
Note: Each entry in this table represents the contemporaneous correlation coefficient of 
the log of the daily returns between a pair of countries for the entire data set period of 
January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
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Table 4
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
Pacific Rim Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the 
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. 
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period. N  = 3,054
Australia 600.67 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 6.53 0.0884
Hong Kong 554.19 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 8.83 0.0317
Japan 262.66 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 2.73 0.4354
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525
Australia 490.08 <.0001
U.S. 5.00 0.1721
Hong Kong 502.81 <.0001
U.S. 12.23 0.0066
Japan 152.30 <.0001
U.S. 7.20 0.0657
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
Australia 118.45 <.0001
U.S. 1.60 0.6593
Hong Kong 98.97 <.0001
U.S. 1.63 0.6519
Japan 88.97 < .0001
U.S. 2.17 0.5384
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Table 5
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal 
connection.
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period, N  = 3.054
France 300.33 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 2.93 0.4018
Germany 180.19 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 4.98 0.1734
Switzerland 244.84 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 6.37 0.0948
U.K. 270.38 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 6.32 0.0972
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N  = 2.525
France 409.20 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 14.68 0 . 0 0 2 1
Germany 176.91 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 1 2 . 2 0 0.0067
Switzerland 349.88 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 2 . 1 0 0.5520
U.K. 307.31 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 4.65 0.1997
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Table 5 (Cont’d)
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal 
connection.
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
France 33.21 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 0.52 0.9150
Germany 26.78 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 3.26 0.3539
Switzerland 29.80 < . 0 0 0 1
US 8 . 0 1 0.0457
UK 37.90 < . 0 0 0 1
US 5.70 0.1270
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Table 6
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Residual Returns, North America
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U..S national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the 
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. 
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period, N  = 3.054
Canada 84.85 < .0001
U.S. 10.91 0.0122
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N  -  2.525
Canada 19.21 < .0001
U.S. 0.87 0.8328
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis, N  = 529
Canada
U.S.
45.35
7.12
<.0001
0.0683
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Table 7
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall Period,
Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Entire Period. N  = 3.054 
Australia 1 0.21599 0.00900
0.03036 0.00991
0.04782 0.00981
23.99
(0 .0001)
3.07
(0.0022)
4.88
(0 .0001)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Hong Kong
Japan
0.24847 0.01085
0.09676 0.01184
0.02707 0.01176
0.22912 0.01418
0.03062 0.01485
0.01944 0.01476
22.91 
(0 .0001)
8.18
(0.0001)
2.30
(0.0214)
16.16
(0.0001)
2.06
(0.0393)
1.32
(0.1881)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 8
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525 
Australia 1 0.25785
2 0.02941
3 0.06775
0.01193
0.01294
0.01301
21.62
(0 .0001)
2.27
(0.0231)
5.21
(0 .0001)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Hong Kong
Japan
0.30987
0.07507
0.05218
0.26178
0.02623
0.00666
0.01422
0.01548
0.01553
0.02148
0.02207
0.02214
21.80 
(0 .0001)
4.85
(0 .0001)
3.36
(0.0008)
12.19 
(0.0001)
1.19
(0.2349)
0.30
(0.7637)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 9
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(P r> |t|)
Period after the Financial Crisis, N  = 529 
Australia 1 0.19208 0.01848
0.02568 0.02082
0.03329 0.02028
10.39
(0.0001)
1.23
(0.2180)
1.64
(0.1013)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Hong Kong
Japan
0.21215 0.02245
0.10366 0.02484
0.01798 0.02433
0.20400 0.02216
0.04016 0.02419
0.04774 0.02383
9.45 
(0 .0001)
4.17
(0.0001)
0.74
(0.4603)
9.21
(0.0001)
1.66
(0.0975)
2.00
(0.0457)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 10
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Overall Period,
European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Entire Period. N  = 3.054 
France 1 0.28056 0.01634
0.07302 0.01747
0.04885 0.01705
17.17
(0.0001)
4.18
(0.0001)
2.86
(0.0042)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
U.K.
0.24941 0.01862
0.06674 0.01952
0.00999 0.01909
0.24468 0.01580
0.07034 0.01680
0.04410 0.01638
0.25005 0.01537
0.05155 0.01642
0.04591 0.01601
13.40 
(0 .0001)
3.42
(0.0006)
0.52
(0.6006)
15.49
(0.0001)
4.19
(0.0001)
2.69
(0.0071)
16.26
(0.0001)
3.14
(0.0017)
2.87
(0.0042)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 11
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis, N  -  2.525
France 0.37810 0.01889
0.08493 0.02036
0.02365 0.02036
20.02
(0.0001)
4.17
(0.0001)
1.16
(0.2455)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
0.28215 0.02138
0.06263 0.02210
0.00176 0.02216
0.36015 0.01934
0.06210 0.02070
0.02030 0.02066
13.20 
(0 .0001)
2.83
(0.0046)
0.08
(0.9365)
18.62
(0.0001)
3.00
(0.0027)
0.98
(0.3259)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 11 (Cont’d) 
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period Prior to 
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis, N  = 2.525
U.K. 0.32016
0.07196
0.02488
0.01839
0.01951
0.01953
17.41
(0.0001)
3.69
(0 .0002)
1.27
(0.2028)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 12
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
France 0.20299
0.05031
0.07092
0.03847
0.04105
0.03930
5.28
(0.0001)
1.23
(0.2209)
1.80
(0.0717)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
0.22182
0.08368
0.02203
0.15793
0.08085
0.08404
0.04417
0.04705
0.04498
0.03417
0.03624
0.03478
5.02 
(0 .0001)
1.78
(0.0759)
0.49
(0.6246)
4.62
(0 .0001)
2.23
(0.0261)
2.42
(0.0160)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 12 (Cont’d) 
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns for Period after 
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(P r> |t|)
Period after the Financial Crisis, N  = 529
U.K. 0.19537
0.03413
0.05956
0.03511
0.03789
0.03613
5.56
(0 .0001)
0.90
(0.3682)
1.65
(0.0998)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
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Table 13
Model Parameter Estimates of Residual Returns, 
North America
Country Lag Estimate Std Error
2 0.07690 0.01254
3 0.05382 0.01238
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis, N  = 2,525 
Canada 1 0.06513 0.01671
2 0.01964 0.01676
3 0.03388 0.01685
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis, N  = 529 
Canada 1 0.10913 0.02460
2 0.13436 0.02560
3 0.08083 0.02502
t-value Variable 
(Pr > |t|)
Panel A: Entire Period, N  = 3,054
Canada 1 0.08507 0.01230 6.92
(0.0001)
6.13
(0.0001)
4.35
(0.0001)
3.90 
(0 .0001)
1.17
(0.2414)
2.01
(0.0444)
4.44
(0.0001)
5.25
(0.0001)
3.23
(0.0013)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
U Sl(t-l)
USl(t-2)
USl(t-3)
63
TABLE 14
State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns for the 
Overall Period
(1) SWt = -0.1549 Au***t-i + 0.2188 SW ***,., - 0.0940 FR** t-i + 0.5331 US***,.i + 
0.2695 CA*’*,., - 0.0897 JA*’*,., -2.0596 AU***, + rn,t
(2) GR, =-0.07224 Au**,., + 0.1322 SW ’**,., - 0.1253 FR*" t-i + 0.3054 US*** ,., + ri2>t
(3) FR, = -0.0705 Au***,., + 0.0757 SW * *,., - 0.2168 FR***,., + 0.0661 UK*",, +
0.1222 US***,.i + 0.1308 CA***,., + rp,t
(4) UK, = -0.0818 Au*,., + 0.1675 SW ***,., - 0.0846 FR*** ,., + 0.4560 US***,., + 0.1796 
CA***,., - 0.0926 JA***,., -1.450 AU***, + r|4 ;t
(5) US, = -0.0704 FR***,.,- 0.1983 U S * * * -0.1026 CA**,, + r|5,t
4. A *  4 *  4*4 4, A A A
(6 ) CA, = 0.1526 SW , ,  + 0.0593 UK , ,  + 0.1540 US „ -0 .0 8 8 8  HK ,.,-0 .6429  
AU***t + Tie,,
(7) HK, = -.0545 GR * * * +  0.2655 UK***,., - 0.0731 HK***,, + 1.0392 AU***, + tp.,
A  A  A A A A  A A A A A A
(8 ) JA, =-0.0803Au „  + 0.1045 SW ,., +0.0764 GR ,., +0.1253 UK ,., +0.2716 
US***,.,-0.0794 HK**,., - 0.7309 AU**, + r |8),
A A A  A A A  a A A  A A A
(9) AU, = - 0.0187 FR ,., -0.06693 US ,.,-  0.0343 CA ,., + 0.0310 HK ,., +
0.3381 AU***t + 0.0847*** + 0.0629*** 1 1 4 ,, + 0.1501*** rjs,, + 0.0744*** ^ 5 ,, - 0.0864***-n7,t
- 0.0353***t|g,t + r|9 ;,
Notes:
*** indicates that result is significant at the 1 percent level 
indicates that result is significant at the 5 percent level 
SW = Switzerland bank return
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Table 15
Correlation Matrix for Returns Volatility
■
■
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 7 4 8 5
< .0001
0 .2 9 5 4 3
< .0001
0 .3 6 8 9 6
< .0001
0 .3 8 3 2 5
< .0001
0 .2 1 3 4 7
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 4 2 8 7
< .0001
0 .3 3 7 2 4
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 0 8 8 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .4 7 4 8 5
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .6 5 7 2 1
< .0001
0 .6 1 6 0 1
< .0001
0 .6 4 0 7 4
< .0001
0 .3 3 9 5 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 0 5 8 2
< .0001
0 .3 5 0 5 4
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 0 9 3 5
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 9 5 4 3
< .0001
0 .6 5 7 2 1
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .6 0 1 3 4
< .0001
0 .5 6 5 7 4
< .0001
0 .4 4 0 2 3
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 1 4 7 9
< .0001
0 .4 5 1 5 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .3 0 8 3 7
< .0 0 0 1
g 0 .3 6 8 9 6
< .0001
0 .6 1 6 0 1
< .0001
0 .6 0 1 3 4
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .6 5 6 6 4
< .0001
0 .3 5 2 1 2
< .0 0 0 1
0 .1 9 6 2 0
< .0001
0 .3 7 3 1 6
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 1 8 7 7
< .0 0 0 1
g 0 .3 8 3 2 5
< .0001
0 .6 4 0 7 4
< .0001
0 .5 6 5 7 4
< .0001
0 .6 5 6 6 4
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 3 8 5 0
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 1 1 1 3
< .0001
0 .3 1 3 7 4
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 6 3 3 5
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 1 3 4 7
< .0001
0 .3 3 9 5 2
< .0001
0 .4 4 0 2 3
< .0001
0 .3 5 2 1 2
< .0001
0 .3 3 8 5 0
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 8 5 2 3
< .0001
0 .1 7 6 6 6
< .0 0 0 1
0 .1 0 5 7 3
< .0 0 0 1
m u 0 .2 4 2 8 7
< .0001
0 .3 0 5 8 2
< .0001
0 .3 1 4 7 9
< .0001
0 .1 9 6 2 0
< .0001
0 .2 1 1 1 3
< .0001
0 .3 8 5 2 3
< .0001
1 .00000 0 .2 5 6 6 3
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 7 3 5 6
< .0 0 0 1
g 0 .3 3 7 2 4
< .0001
0 .3 5 0 5 4
< .0001
0 .4 5 1 5 2
< .0001
0 .3 7 3 1 6
< .0001
0 .3 1 3 7 4
< .0001
0 .1 7 6 6 6
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 5 6 6 3
< .0001
1 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 9 3 9 6
< .0 0 0 1
g 0 .3 0 8 8 2
< .0001
0 .3 0 9 3 5
< .0001
0 .3 0 8 3 7
< .0001
0 .2 1 8 7 7
< .0001
0 .2 6 3 3 5
< .0001
0 .1 0 5 7 3
< .0 0 0 1
0 .2 7 3 5 6
< .0001
0 .3 9 3 9 6
< .0 0 0 1
1 .0 0 0 0 0
Note: Each entry in this table represents the contemporaneous correlation coefficient of 
the log of the daily returns volatility between a pair of countries for the entire data set 
period of January 4, 1999 through September 24, 2010.
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Table 16
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
Pacific Rim Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine whether the 
U.S. index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. 
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period. N  = 3.054
Australia 228.31 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 82.76 < . 0 0 0 1
Hong Kong 31.13 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 46.49 < . 0 0 0 1
Japan 68.71 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 29.52 < . 0 0 0 1
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525
Australia 179.39 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 107.63 < . 0 0 0 1
Hong Kong 35.89 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 65.72 < . 0 0 0 1
Japan 29.57 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 15.29 0.0016
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
Australia 37.30 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 11.80 0.0081
Hong Kong 2.38 0.4933
U.S. 5.38 0.1459
Japan 13.30 0.0040
U.S. 6.84 0.0771
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Table 17
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal 
connection.
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period. N  = 3,054
France 105.54 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 63.71 < . 0 0 0 1
Germany 9.40 0.0244
U.S. 80.17 < . 0 0 0 1
Switzerland 68.84 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 94.12 < . 0 0 0 1
U.K. 127.40 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 158.79 < . 0 0 0 1
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525
France 77.95 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 58.99 < . 0 0 0 1
Germany 42.66 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 11.95 0.0076
Switzerland 118.82 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 49.52 < . 0 0 0 1
U.K. 143.42 < . 0 0 0 1
U.S. 64.95 < . 0 0 0 1
67
Table 17 (Cont’d)
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility,
European Countries
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the U.S. national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the U.S. national banking sector index to determine this causal 
connection.
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
France 17.50 0.0006
U.S. 8.39 0.0386
Germany 2.57 0.4625
U.S. 14.65 0 . 0 0 2 1
Switzerland 12.31 0.0064
U.S. 8.83 0.0316
U.K. 17.23 0.0006
U.S. 26.26 < . 0 0 0 1
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Table 18
Granger-Causality Wald Test for Returns Volatility, North America
This Granger-causality test provides a directional causation test providing evidence of 
whether the US national banking sector index is influencing or exerting directional 
momentum on the other respective national banking sector indices or vice versa. Each 
country is paired with the US national banking sector index to determine whether the US 
index influences the respective national banking sector indices or vice versa.
Country Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square
Panel A: Entire Period. N  -  3.054
Canada 110.20 <.0001
U.S. 70.04 <.0001
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525
Canada
U.S.
16.37
36.37
0.0008 
< .0001
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
Canada
U.S.
18.79
13.63
0.0003
0.0035
69
Table 19
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall Period,
Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr> jt|)
Entire Period, N  = 3.054 
Australia 1 0.04143 0.00313
-0.00118 0.00324
0.01684 0.00321
13.22
(0.0001)
-0.37
(0.7146)
5.24
(0.0001)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
Hong Kong
Japan
0.02667 0.00579
0.00203 0.00583
0.01142 0.00578
0.04564 0.00671
-0.00607 0.00680
0.02370 0.00674
4.61 
(0 .0001)
0.35
(0.7279)
1.79
(0.0488)
6.80 
(0.0001)
-0.89
(0.3720)
3.52
(0.0004)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 20
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2.525 
Australia 1 0.06949
2 -0.00922
3 0.02935
0.00597
0.00616
0.00606
11.65
(0 .0001)
-1.50
(0.1347)
4.84
(0.0001)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
Hong Kong
Japan
0.04774
-0.00346
0.01810
0.06963
0.01711
-0.00728
0.00933
0.00938
0.00931
0.01416
0.01421
0.01425
5.12 
(0 .0001)
-0.37
(0.7123)
1.94
(0.0520)
4.92
(0.0001)
1.20
(0.2287)
-0.51
(0.6092)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 21
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, Pacific Rim Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value 
(Pr > |t|)
Variable
Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
Australia 1 0.03480 0.00639 5.45
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
US2 (t-1)
2 -0.00159 0.00657 -0.24
(0.8088)
US2(t-2)
3 0.01437 0.00655 2.19
(0.0286)
US2(t-3)
Hong Kong 1 0.01759 0.01280 1.37
(0.1700)
US2(t-l)
2 -0.00218 0.01284 -0.17
(0.8654)
US2(t-2)
3 0.00699 0.01278 0.55
(0.5848)
US2(t-3)
Japan 1 0.03727 0.01217 3.06
(0.0023)
US2(t-l)
2 -0.01152 0.01233 -0.93
(0.3505)
US2(t-2)
3 0.02040 0.01225 1 . 6 6
(0.0966)
US2(t-3)
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Table 22
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Overall Period,
European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value
(Pr > |t|)
Variable
Entire Period. N  = 3.054 
France 1 0.05984 0.01098
0.00374 0.01100
0.08553 0.01092
5.45
(0.0001)
0.34
(0.7342)
7.83
(0 .0001)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
U.K.
0.02486 0.01341
-0.02933 0.01337
0.01802 0.01329
0.07007 0.00938
0.00985 0.00946
0.04630 0.00940
0.09782 0.00950
-0.00136 0.00926
0.03578 0.00946
1.85
(0 .0638)
-2.19
(0.0283)
1.36
(0.1752)
7.47
(0 .0001)
1.04
(0.2977)
4.93
(0.0001)
10.29
(0 .0001)
-0.14
(0.8874)
3.78
(0.0002)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 23
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2,525 
France 1 0.10200
2 0.05520
3 -0.01136
0.01440
0.01450
0.014668
7.08
(0 .0001)
3.81
(0 .0001)
-0.78
(0.4382)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
0.08910
0.01831
-0.01515
0.12403
0.01836
-0.00486
0.01354
0.01360
0.01370
0.01201
0.01224
0.01224
6.05 
(0 .0001)
1.35
(0.1785)
- 1.11
(0.2689)
10.32
(0.0001)
1.50
(0.1338)
-0.40
(0.6914)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 23 (Cont’d) 
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period Prior to 
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2,525
U.K. 0.10713 0.01013
0.03714 0.01033
-0.009680 0.01042
10.57
(0 .0001)
3.79
(0.0002)
-0.93
(0.3526)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 24
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(P r> |t|)
Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529 
France 1 0.04729 0.02549
-0.01370 0.02548
0.09081 0.02528
1.86
(0.0642)
-0.54
(0.5911)
3.59
(0.0004)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
Germany
Switzerland
0.00055 0.03304
-0.05266 0.03293
0.00218 0.03279
0.05715 0.02171
0.00210 0.02185
0.04561 0.02172
0.02
(0 .9866)
-1.60
(0.1104)
0.07
(0.9469)
2.63
(0.0087)
0.10
(0.9234)
2.10
(0.0362)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
US2(t-l)
US2(t-2)
US2(t-3)
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Table 24 (Cont’d) 
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility for Period after 
Financial Crisis, European Countries
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
(Pr > |t|)
Period after the Financial Crisis. N  — 529
U.K. 1 0.08853 0.02326 3.81 US2(t-l)
(0.0002)
2 -0.01514 0.02345 -0.65 US2(t-2)
(0.5188)
3 0.03261 0.02305 1.41 US2(t-3)
(0.1578)
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Table 25
Model Parameter Estimates of Returns Volatility, 
North America
Country Lag Estimate Std Error t-value Variable
_________________________________________________________(Pr>lt|)____________
Panel A: Entire Period. N  = 3,054
Canada 1 0.04511 0.00498 9.05 US2(t-l)
(0.0001)
2 0.00366 0.00502 0.73 US2(t-2)
(0.4664)
3 0.02058 0.00498 4.13 US2(t-3)
(0 .0001)
Panel B: Period prior to Financial Crisis. N  = 2,525
Canada 1 0.02699 0.00692 3.90 US2(t-l)
( 0  .0 0 0 1 )
2 0.00478 0.00692 0.69 US2(t-2)
(0.4896)
3 -0.00320 0.00696 -0.46 US2(t-3)
(0.6458)
Panel C: Period after the Financial Crisis. N  = 529
Canada 1 0.04474 0.01165 3.84 US2(t-l)
(0 .0001)
2 -0.00139 0.01175 -0.12 US2(t-2)
(0.9059)
3 0.02077 0.01164 1.78 US2(t-3)
(0.0751)
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TABLE 26
State Space Estimates of Linkages Among Banks Returns Volatility for 
the Overall Period
(1) SW2t = -0.1127 AU2*\-i -0.1013 SW2 **\_, -0.0326 GR2**t4 + 0.1464 CA2**\.i + 
0.2370 HK2***t-i - 0.0897 JA2***t4 +2.464 AU2***t + q ,,
* *  * * *  * * *
(2) GR2t =-1.2248 AU2 t-i -0.3397 SW2 t., -0.1484 GR2 t4 + 0.1380 UK2 t4-
0.1810 US2***t-i +0.4755 HK2***t4 + 0.2406 JA2*"., + 6.5321 AU2***t+£>,t
(3) FR2, = -0.4673 AU2 -0.2832 SW2 t4 -0.0802 FR2 t-i + 0.1444 UK2 t- i- 
0.0551 US2***t4 + 0.1720 CA2***t4 + 0.2710 HK2***t., + 3.1182 AU2***t + q3>t
4s Jfc & 4 4 4  4t4s4s
(4) UK2t = -0.4992 AU2 t4 -0.1983 SW2 M -0.1260 GR2 M+0.0520 FR2 t-i + 
0.0872 UK2***t-i + 0.0912 CA2*** t4 + 0.2333 HK2***M - 0.0926 JA2***t4 + 2.795 AU2***t +
?4,t
(5) US2t = -0.4559 AU2***t.i -0.2651 SW2***m + 0.3279 UK2**\-i -0.0603 US2***t4 
+0.1574 CA2**M +0.2871 HK2***t4 + 4.7166 AU2***t + q s,t
4c344c *  4
(6) CA2t = 0.0785 SW2 t4 +0.0204 FR2 M -0.0366 CA2 t4 + 0.1137 HK2 t4 -0.0324 
JA2 ***t4 + 0.9263 AU2***t + g6>,
(7) HK, = -0.4025 AU2***t., -0.1459 GR2 ***t4 -0.0609 FR2*’t.i -0.0366 CA2**,_i + 0.3251
& 4t 4* * * *  4c4(34
HK2 t_! + 0.1507 JA2 t., + 0.9263 AU2 t + g?,t
(8) JA2t = -0.4616 AU2***t-i -0.0533 GR2*’*t4 + 0.0359 UK2**,4 -0.0503 US2*** M - 
0.1340 HK2***t4 +0.0598 JA2***t4 +2.4050 AU2**t + qiJt
(9) AU, = -0.1349 AU2***t-i -0.0581 SW2***t4 -0.02161 GR2**Vi + 0.0186 FR2***t_, - 
0.0290 US2***t-i -0.0228 CA2***t4 +0.0620 HK2***t4 + 0.0129 JA2**t4+ 1.3445 AU2***t +
A * *  *44 444  444  444 444
0.1410 g., +0.0580 g2>t +0.0182 g3,t -0.0157 t4 g4,t + 0.0270 q^ + 0.0380 g7. t - 
0.0543*** 8^>t + s 9it
Notes:
*** indicates that result is significant at the 1 percent level
** indicates that result is significant at the 5 percent level
SW2 = Switzerland bank return volatility
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